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From Full Employment to the Natural Rate 










On its face, unemployment seems to be a concept easy to grasp. But 
when one looks closer, the intricacies are numerous and assump-tions 
are multiple. Nowadays, the New Classical School is a bit closer to 
New Keynesianism than ever before. It still has a strong footprint in 
Monetarism, since in the long run, there is no interest in stabilizing an 
economy. But unlike the Classical school, the New Classical School 
concedes that in the short run things are much more complicated. If 
Keynes was right when he said, “in the long run, we are all dead,” one 
may even conclude that the New Classical School is far more Keynes-
ian than it first appears. 
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“Ideas shape the course of history” 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
In the U.S. after the Second World War, the commitment was made by 
the federal government to “use all practicable means… to promote 
maximum employment, production, and purchasing power.” To this 
end it established the Council of Economic Advisers and created the 
Joint Committee on the Economic Report, bodies which are jointly in-
dicative of the assumption of federal responsibility for the general eco-
nomic welfare of the nation. The support given by President Eisen-
hower to the Council, and his request for modifications of the original 
act to strengthen the Council administratively, supports the validity of 
the earlier premise that the commitment to economic stabilization tran-
scended political boundaries and was made a permanent national prior-
ity. According to Strayer (1954), 1954 marks a new perception in the 
role of government towards full employment and welfare. 
 
The notion of unemployment seems to be well understood since many 
people, from economists to laypeople, use it with relative frequency. 
But when one looks closer, the notion of unemployment hides a world 
of complexity with which even economists have trouble dealing. Un-
employment reflects employment, full employment, underemployment, 
and the natural rate of unemployment, to name a few concepts. Before 
looking at the many facets of unemployment with a more precise lens, 
let us begin with a few definitions.  
 
UNEMPLOYMENT. In 1947, F. A. Buchardt (University of Oxford, 
1947) looked at theories about the “Cause of Unemployment.” Bu-
chardt ascribed unemployment to deviations from free competition: 
“monopolistic organizations in industry and in the labor market… re-
strict output and employment opportunities.” Buchardt believed in the 
“revolutionary discovery” of his predecessors that the market does not 
automatically produce full employment. This rendered “obsolete” the 
idea that market forces lead to a rational utilization of resources. 4    
 
Through this lens m arket structure creates market failures and unem-
ployment is, by definition, involuntary. 
 
FULL EMPLOYMENT. Having defined unemployment, it becomes 
easy to describe full employment. Full employment, is “[an] economic 
norm…destined to achieve in the twentieth century an acknowledged 
priority comparable to the position held by the division of labor in the 
eighteenth century, and by the optimum allocation of resources in the 
nineteenth century,”  Benoit-Smullyan (1948). Whereas the notion of 
unemployment is positive, full employment embodies a normative ap-
proach. If unemployment is due to market misallocations, then full 
employment is rooted in active economic policies. 
 
UNDEREMPLOYMENT. Before implementing active policies with 
respect to maintaining full employment, it is vital to question to know 
in which areas the economy is underemployed. In his paper, Hansen 
(1947) emphasized the danger of inflation due to general under capac-
ity of fixed plant and equipment. 
 
Essentially, this questioned the nature of production cost structure, and 
more generally, the efficiency of the structure of the economy. Without 
coining it in the modern way, Hansen (1947) addressed the question of 
market failures and full employment: “the price system continuing full 
employment is in the nature of the case not feasible, that to have stable 
employment it is necessary to have several million employed (…). This 
is due to inadequate fixed-capital capacity (…). (T)he distortion is in-
herent in the nature of the cost structure.” One can note the use and as-
sociation of the words ‘nature’ and ‘structure.’ As we shall study later, 
this association will be coined in discussions regarding the concept of 
the natural rate of unemployment. 
 
To Hansen (1947), “The term ‘capacity’ as the literature reveals, is not 
easy to define in a satisfactory manner, since there is no one ‘capacity’ 
output which could not be exceeded more or less if the fixed plant were 
more intensively utilized. ‘Capacity’ may perhaps best be defined in 
terms of the total unit cost at varying degrees of intensive use of the 
fixed factor. Thus in a highly fluctuating economy, it might be true that 
a firm would tend to adjust its fixed factor so as to produce the ‘normal 
(Schumpeter) amount at lowest total unit cost would rise more or less 
steeply. Thus one could say that the economy was operating at ‘opti-  5 
mum capacity’ at the ‘normal’ phase in the cycle.” This ‘optimum ca-
pacity’ leads to full employment if there are no further distortions, and 
wages can be defined as ‘efficiency wages.’  
 
NATURAL RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT. Friedman (1968) derives 
the ‘natural rate hypothesis’ (NRH) from Wicksell's (1936) concept of 
the ‘natural’ rate of interest: “The ‘natural rate of unemployment’ is the 
level that would be ground out by the Walrasian system of general 
equilibrium equations, provided there is imbedded in them the actual 
structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets, includ-
ing market imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and sup-
plies, the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor 
availabilities, the cost of mobility, and so on” (Friedman, 1968). Ac-
cording to the NRH, unemployment consists of the sum of a structural 
component called the natural rate, and a cyclical component reflecting 
short-run business cycle fluctuations. 
 
These definitions are landmarks in the history of monetary policy. 
They have been developed at different periods and serve as new as-
sumptions in the fights between the main schools of thought. Sections 
2 and 3 present the Keynesian and Monetarist Schools. Section 4 intro-
duces the New Classical School. Section 5 develops the new arguments 
proposed by the modern literature. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Full Employment: The Keynesian School 
 
 
The notion of full employment was largely discussed by Joan Robin-
son in Essays on the Theory of Employment (Robinson, 1937).  To 
Joan Robinson, full employment is synonymous with the absence of 
involuntary unemployment. Moreover, Joan Robinson argued that full 
employment could never be attained in practice: “It seems preferable to 
say that full employment, in a precise sense, can never be attained so 
long as frictions exist, rather than to use ‘full employment’ in an im-
precise sense in which it can be said to be attainable, such unemploy-
ment as remains being vaguely attributed to frictions.” 
 
As it was later described by  Benoit-Smullyan (1948), “Full employ-
ment is sometimes identified with total or maximum employment. In 6    
 
this sense full employment does not exist unless every person who 
could perform some useful labor holds a job whether or not he desires 
one (…). In the terminology of modern economics ‘unemployment = 
involuntary unemployment’.” Properly understood, full employment 
excludes the employment of any individuals who, for one reason or 
another, prefer not to work. Thus, full employment is attained when the 
number of job vacancies equals the existing labor force. In Benoit-
Smullyan's (1948) interpretation, this neither requires the maximization 
of the labor force, nor the employment of this labor force for the 
maximum achievable number of hours. 
 
Until Keynes (1936), full employment implicitly r equired the maxi-




Can we good beyond  full employment? 
 
We have said that to have full employment there must be at least as 
many real job vacancies as there are employable job applicants. But 
ought there not be more? Was Sir William Beveridge incorrect when 
he claimed that full employment “means having always more vacant 
jobs than unemployed men” (Beveridge, 1945)? 
 
Even before the work of Lucas (1972) which marked the starting point 
of the New Classical School, and right after Friedman's (1968) and 
Phelps' (1967) definition of the ‘natural rate of unemployment’, a pa-
per by Pfouts (1970) challenged the predominant Chicago School and 
brought the Keynesian’s back into the game. According to Pfouts 
(1970), “As an economy approaches full employment a new order of 
questions, both theoretical and practical arises. Many of these ques-
tions relate to the methods of maintaining full employment, but others 
refer to the possibilities of there being a fuller of fullest employment 
beyond mere full employment.” In tackling this issue, Pfouts (1970) re-
introduced the idea of government intervention through expansionist 
policies: “Specifically, if we suppose that labor is fully employed, but 
that there are other resources which could be exploited but are not be-
ing exploited, should attempts be made by increasing the stock of capi-
tal to exploit these unused resources thus obtaining a higher level of 
living?” (Pfouts, 1970).   7 
 
Government intervention for stabilization can take the form of fiscal, 
monetary, or structural policies. 
 
First, with respect to fiscal policy, Gurley (1952) made a strong argu-
ment in favour of  stabilization policies using the fiscal device. He de-
nied the fact that only one fiscal policy – a public deficit for instance – 
should be used. Moreover, he argued that any fiscal policy (surplus, 
balance, or deficit) can lead towards full employment, and the choice 
of the fiscal policy should be based on the initial conditions. 
 
Second, and with respect to monetary policy, the core of Keynesian po-
lemics is the relationship between price flexibility and full employment. 
The fundamental argument of Keynes was directed against the belief 
that price flexibility can be depended upon to generate full employ-
ment automatically. This assumption marks the origin of the cleavage 
between Keynesianism and the classical tradition of Monetarism. 
Monetarists insisted upon such automaticity as a basic principle, since 
it is the counter part of the invisible hand applied to macroeconomics. 
In other words, there is no need to call for government intervention 
through stabilization policies or expansionary monetary policies, since 
economic forces balance automatically. According to  Don Patinkin 
(1948), “[in] a static world with a constant stock of money, price flexi-
bility assures full employment. But in the real dynamic world in which 
we live, price flexibility with a constant stock of money might generate 
full employment only after a long period; or might even lead to a defla-
tionary spiral of continuous unemployment.”  Don Patinkin (1948) 
demonstrated that full employment cannot be the outcome of a passive 
monetary policy targeting a constant stock of money and waiting for 
the economic system to generate full employment automatically 
through a decline in prices. It is striking to note that  Don Patinkin 
(1948) described a deflationary bias without noting any impact on the 
unemployment rate. As we shall see later, Kydland & Prescott (1977) 
will formulate the idea of inflationary bias: latent inflation with no im-
pact on the unemployment rate.  
 
The Keynesian edifice can be summarized by the following equation 
which represents the relationship between the production function (ag-
gregate supply) and the price level, where  b  is the elasticity of labor: 8    
 









  (1) 
Thus, a rise in the level of prices reduces the real wage, and pushes 
employers to hire more. 
 
Finally, with respect to structural policy, Hamberg (1952) writes “It 
should be clear that the mistaken belief that full capacity growth will 
assure full employment growth rest on two assumptions: (1) that an 
equilibrium of full employment of labor and capital exists at the outset 
of our analysis, and (2) that the coefficient of required growth equals 
unity. While plausible, these assumptions are by no means general.” In 
other words, an economic structure that runs at full capacity does not 
lead to full employment. 
 
This question had already been addressed by Keynes (1936) however: 
“It is indeed, very possible that the prolongation of approximately full 
employment over a period of years would be associated in countries so 
wealthy as Great Britain or the United States with a volume of new in-
vestment, assuming the existing propensity to consume, so great that it 
would eventually lead to a state of full investment in the sense that an 
aggregate gross yield in excess of replacement cost could no longer be 
expected on a reasonable calculation from a further increment of dura-
ble goods of any type whatever. Moreover this situation might be 
reached comparatively soon – say within twenty-five years or less. I 
must not be taken to deny this, because I assert that a state of full in-
vestment in the strict sense has never yet occurred, not even momentar-
ily.” Thus at full employment it is possible to increase both the stock of 
capital and  productive capacity by maintaining the proper conditions. 
 
But implementing active policies may raise some fine-tuning questions. 
The concern about full employment initiated by  Harrod (1960) and 
Domar (1947) involved two main aspects summarized by  Nelson 
(1966): “Active stabilization policy may be required for two different 
reasons. First, in the absence of active policy it may be impossible to 
achieve the parameter values consistent with full employment; this 
might be the case, for example, if there is an interest rate floor. Second, 
even if the parameters can be achieved without active policy, tenden-
cies of the system to move and stay at full employment may be weak.”   9 
In other words, full employment seems to be a highly unstable equilib-
rium. 
 
Although he agreed on the efficiency of economic policies (but not 
‘stabilization’ policies), Kaldor (1938) examined a range of problems 
involved with policies aimed at maintaining a steady state of full em-
ployment: “Most economists are agreed that Governments have greater 
power in this matter than they are in the habit of employing, and we are 
nearing agreement also as to the factors that determines the efficiency 
of different policies to that end. But I think there is less agreement, and 
perhaps also less awareness, about the further problem, of how to keep 
the system  stable, at a reasonable level of prosperity: in other words, 




An example of an economic policy: the concept of full employment 
surplus 
 
Although it has roots in the 1930s, the concept of full employment sur-
plus dates back to a proposal made in 1947 by the U.S. Committee for 
Economic Development (CED) that the budget be designed to “yield a 
moderate surplus at high-employment national income.” The full em-
ployment surplus is the difference between full employment revenues 
and full employment expenditures. 
 
The full employment surplus is an estimate of what the federal surplus 
would be if the economy were operating along the path of its potential 
gross national product (GNP). It is, thus, not affected by fluctuations in 
economic activity that shrink or enlarge the revenue base relative to the 
path of potential growth (Okun & Teeters, 1970). A higher full em-
ployment surplus is an indicator of a more restrictive fiscal policy. 
 
In some respects, the full employment surplus is a static concept. It de-
scribes how much fiscal policy is pushing the economy in a given pe-
riod – it does not provide any information as to the expected timing of 
the resultant movement in economic activity. While a dynamic process 
is implied, it is not specified. 
 
 10    
 
Barriers to full employment 
 
What are the factors that prevent economies from being at full em-
ployment? 
 
Answers are abundant, but it is striking that the Monetarists blame the 
government, and not the market. Indeed, government intervention was 
almost always synonymous with government failures, while the market 
was never held culpable for spawning market failures. 
 
According to Warner (1975), “There are fiscal barriers to full employ-
ment which discourage the employment of low-skill and low-wage 
workers.” In his article, he argues that “[there] are a number of subsi-
dies to capital investment in the tax and regulatory systems which en-
courage adoption of relatively more capital intensive techniques and 
probably less employment of low-wage workers than would exist in 
their absence (…). Indeed, even though there are offsetting full em-
ployment policies at the macro-economic level, these structural distor-
tions undercut the effectiveness of such policies by exacerbating the 
problems associated with unemployment and excessive demand for 
capital goods.” In one way or another,  Monetarists argue that govern-
ment intervention creates distortions that either reduce or expand pro-
duction. 
 
Inequalities it can also be argued, are at the origin of all barriers to full 
employment. Michael Kalecki (University of Oxford, 1947) explained 
that unemployment is the result of political opposition to income trans-
fers. Kalecki (University of Oxford, 1947) weighed the relative merits 
of (1) deficit spending, (2) stimulating private investment, and (3) re-
distributing income from the rich to the poor, as “Three ways to Full 
employment.” Kalecki’s general conclusions were that stimulating pri-
vate investment is relatively unsatisfactory, and that income transfers 
are promising, but will probably have to be supplemented by public 
deficit spending. 
 
In the same edited volume, Schumacher’s essay on “Public Finance – 
Its Relation to Full Employment” states explicitly the implicit position 
of his colleagues that “the ultimate cause of unemployment in modern 
society is to be found in the prevailing distribution of incomes”; subse-
quently, the principal rationale of taxation is redistribution, not the   11 
avoidance of inflation as Keynes had argued. As long as there is a re-
turn on investment, a transfer of income from richer to poorer persons 




3.  The Natural Rate Hypothesis: Latest step of Monetarism 
 
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the appearance of a new definition of 
unemployment dramatically changed the balance between Keynesians 
and Monetarists. Until then, Monetarists had a hard t ime arguing 
against the predominant Keynesian interpretation.  Starting in 1968, 
however, Monetarism would take the lead and g ive birth to a new 
school of thought: the New Classical School. 
 
One of the first discussions over the definition of full employment ap-
peared in Meyers (1946). According to Meyers (1946) “If full em-
ployment meant complete absence of unemployment, of course any in-
novation would be confronted with the difficulty of attracting workers 
away from their present jobs. If full employment means an equal num-
ber of jobs available and unemployed persons, however, such innova-
tion may be able to draw its workers from the “frictionally unem-
ployed.” 
 
Another analysis was  Benoit-Smullyan's (1948): “Full employment 
would then be indicated whenever existing unemployment did not ex-
ceed the amount of (frictional) unemployment estimated by the normal, 
or necessary, result of inadequate labor market information, and of im-
perfect labor mobility.” 
 
The outcome of this friction is captured in the concept coined by 
Blanchard & Summers (1986): hysteresis. In physics, hysteresis refers 
to an object failing to return to its original state after being changed by 
an external force. In the labor market, a similar phenomenon arises. A 
change in aggregate demand first influences unemployment by causing 
it to deviate from the natural rate of unemployment, but then has a per-
sistent effect on unemployment as the natural rate of unemployment 
changes. Blanchard & Wolfers (2000) apply the concept of hysteresis 
to explain the large rise in the NAIRU in Europe during the 1980s . 12    
 
 
In 1968 Friedman (1968) invented a concept that would revive Mone-
tarism by challenge the Phillips curve: the natural rate of unemploy-
ment. This new concept is integrated in the new rational expectations 
assumption: “we (in particular Phelps, 1967, Phelps, 1970) and myself 
Friedman, (1968) developed an alternative h ypothesis that distin-
guished between the short-run and long-run effects of unanticipated 
changes in aggregate nominal demand” (Friedman, 1977). 
 
This notion would give new strength to the argument against stabiliza-
tion policies. The Keynesian paradigm guided demand-side policies 
during the “new economics” years of the 1960s. By the 1970s, Mone-
tarism denied that pure fiscal policies, changes in overall expenditures, 
and taxation that leave money stocks unaffected, have more than minor 
and transitory effects on nominal income.  
 
According to Friedman (1968), monetary policy cannot peg interest 
rates and the rate of unemployment for more than very limited periods. 
Relating Wicksell (1936), Friedman (1968) explains, “The preceding 
analysis of interest rates can be translated fairly directly into Wicksel-
lian terms. The monetary authority can make the market rate less than 
the natural rate only by inflation. It can make the market rate higher 
than the natural rate only by deflation (…).” 
 
The following equation summarizes the “expectations-augmented Phil-
lips curve’, where  t u  is the unemployment rate, u %  is the natural unem-
ployment rate,  t p D  is the change in price, and  ( ) 1 tt Ep - D  is the ex-
pected change in price by agents: 







%   (2) 
 
Moreover, according to Friedman (1968), “Money is only a m achine, 
but it is an extraordinary efficient machine. Without it, we could not 
have begun to attain astounding growth in output and level of living we 
have experienced in the past two centuries – any more than we could 
have done so without those other marvellous machines that dot our 
countryside and enable us, for the most part, simply to do more effi-
ciently what could be done without them at much greater cost in l a-  13 
bor.” In other words, money is a technological innovation. But because 
money is an innovation that effects the whole economy, it has to be 
kept under control: “The first and most important lesson that history 
teaches about what monetary policy can do (…) is that monetary policy 
can prevent money itself from being a major source of economic dis-
turbance” (Friedman, 1968). Furthermore, the Monetarists’ doctrine at-
tributed  the major economic fluctuations of history to the instability of 
monetary supplies rather than exogenous real shocks (Tobin, S, Poole, 
Feldstein, Houthakker, Modigliani, Hendershott, Friedman, Perry, 




4.  From natural rate to the New Classical School 
 
 
Interestingly enough, Phillips (1958) brought new perspectives to the 
Keynesian/neo-Keynesian camp. His relationship between wage rates 
and u nemployment added one more b rick to the edifice started by 
Keynes: policies matter. Incidentally, his paper also revived the oppo-
site camp by giving them a chance to spawn a new attack against 
Keynesianism. In 1961, Muth (1961) introduced the rational expecta-
tions concept. From Keynes (1936) to Phillips (1958), money was not 
neutral. But with the rise of the Chicago School, activist monetary and 
fiscal policies were argued to have, at best, no effects on real economic 
variables; at worst they could be responsible for a net increase in eco-
nomic instability—distortions created by government policies. 
 
A more precise statement of the lessons of the Monetarists and ‘policy 
neutrality’ view is that deterministic policy rules have no effects on 
real economic variables, but stochastic policy behavior can increase the 
variability of real variables. Although the formal analysis supporting 
this view is, invariably, conducted in terms of monetary policy alone, 
McCallum notes that conclusions are often phrased in terms of stabili-
zation policy in general (McCallum, 1977). 
 
The rational expectations concept was introduced by Muth (1961) and 
was first applied to macroeconomics by Lucas (1972). The basic in-
sight is that private sector behavior is influenced in many ways by ex-
pectations of future variables. If changes in government b ehavior 14    
 
causes shifts in these expectations, models that ignore such links to 
government behavior are unlikely to forecast accurately. The assump-
tion of Muth-rational expectations provides the additional hypothesis 
that the link between private sector expectations and government be-
havior comes through the private sector’s knowledge of the true struc-
ture of the model, including the parameters that describe government 
behavior. The proxy used by the economic literature to characterize the 
structure of the economy is the concept of the natural rate of unem-
ployment. 
 
The natural rate of unemployment also has a synonym, NAIRU, which 
is an acronym for non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment. At 
any point in time, there will be an unemployment rate consistent with 
stable inflation. 
 
The NAIRU concept brought a new impetus to the debate over “rules 
versus discretion.” This debate dates back to the dissensions between 
the Currency School and the Banking School that preceded the Peel’s 
Act of 1844. The Currency School defended the idea of a rule of mone-
tary policy based on the quantity theory. It is no surprise that David 
Ricardo was the proponent of the quantity theory as well as the head of 
the Currency School. The Banking School was in favor of discretion-
ary monetary policy, however. In its early ages, the debate turned to 
the advantage of the Currency School, but during the period between 
1844 and 1914 for instance, the Bank of England actively and discre-
tionarily adjusted its discount rate. In the 1920s and 1930s, American 
monetary policy was strongly discretionary.  Keynes (1936) made a 
strong theoretical case – if not a revolutionary one compared to the 
classical paradigm  – in favour of discretionary and active policies. 
Keynesianism won the debate over its counterpart, namely Monetarism, 
until the first critics of the Phillips curve emerged (Phillips, 1958). 
 
According to Friedman (1968), the Phillips curve should be formulated 
by considering the growth rate of real wages instead of nominal wages. 
Friedman specified the Phillips curve in terms of anticipated real 
wages, henceforth called the “expectations-augmented Phillips curve.” 
 
The “rules versus discretion” debate studied through the lens of ra-
tional expectations would, from now on, bend towards the proponents 
of the rule. Monetarism would give birth to the “New Classical   15 
School.” The big divide between the schools stems from the creation of 
the natural rate of unemployment concept. At once, this concept helped 
weaken the Keynesian edifice and destroy the Phillips curve, but also 
led to a smoothing of the Monetarist doctrine: economic policies, be 
they monetary or fiscal, may have some i mpacts in the short-run at 
least. The bases of the New Classical School can be found in the works 
of Lucas (1972), Sargent (1973), and Sargent & Wallace (1975). 
 
The following equation represents the NAIRU curve with a non-
anticipated exogenous shock, noted  t m : 







%   (3) 
 
With the “time inconsistency” concept, Kydland & Prescott (1977) in-
dicate that there exists a temptation for a central bank not to respect ex 
post its own ex ante monetary objectives. Rational expectations agents, 
aware of this behaviour, will react accordingly and push the whole sys-
tem to an inflationary economy without real i mprovement. This is 
known as the inflationary bias (Barro & Gordon, 1983). 
 
The literature defines a loss function for the central bank based on the 
NAIRU, where e  is the relative weight of inflation compared to un-
employment: 
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  (5) 
This result represents the inflation rate that will occur in the economy; 
its impact on the unemployment rate with rational agents will be nil 
since 
  t uu = %  (6) 
 16    
 
Barro & Gordon (1983) explained that by improving the “credibility” 
of the central bank, the inflationary bias should be reduced. The litera-
ture would propose may ways of improving the credibility: hiring a 
conservative central banker (Rogoff, 1985); central bank independence 
(Neumann, 1991); and central banker performance contracts (Waller, 
1995, Walsh, 1995), among other options. 
 
Since then, the “rules versus discretion” debate has become a “credibil-
ity versus flexibility” debate. Not only is this a change in the definition, 
it also prompted a change in policy conclusions. Indeed, an economic 
policy may be efficient in the “rules versus discretion” framework. 
With the inception of credibility versus flexibility debate, an economic 
policy may not only be efficient,  it may also be required to allow for 
flexibility in the face of economic a djustments due to exogenous 
shocks. 
 
The following equation represents the impact on the unemployment 
rate of a certain degree of flexibility (noted by d) given to the central 













%   (7) 
 
This trend seems to allow economists to take a less doctrinaire position 
and employ a more scientific attitude in the face of the complexities of 
countries’ economies. 
 
In classical theory, money is neutral. It is only the numeraire in which 
prices are quoted. But this is also true for the New Classical School as 
Collignon (2005) recalls: “Money is neutral and can only be a distur-
bance, causing temporary deviations from the natural level, although 
political authorities may be tempted by ‘time inconsistent behaviour 
(Cukierman, 1992) to increase employment.”  
 
The key question facing theorists is why this classical theorem of 
monetary neutrality fails to hold in the real world (Ball & Mankiw, 
2002). According to Ball & Mankiw (2002), many answers have been 
proposed: imperfect information (Friedman, 1968, Lucas, 1973); long-
term labor contracts (Fischer, 1977, Gray, 1976, Taylor, 1980); the 
costs of price adjustment (Mankiw, 1985, Rotemberg, 1982); and de-  17 
partures from full rationality (Akerlof & Yellen, 1985). Thus, because 
of some market imperfections – and not only government failures –, 
changes in the value of the unit of account matter. In these types of 
conditions monetary neutrality breaks down, and at least in the short-
run, monetary changes have opposite effects on inflation and unem-
ployment (Ball & Mankiw, 2002). 
 
Various aspects of the policy neutrality view can be found in  Barro 
(1976), Lucas (1972),  and Sargent & Wallace (1975). Since Kydland 
& Prescott (1977), the professional consensus seems to have shifted 
towards a more balanced view of the scope within which  fiscal and 
monetary policy influences cyclical fluctuations – stabilization policy – 
and co-determines the nature of the long-run growth trend of the eco-
nomic system (Buiter, 1980). 
 
Nowadays, according to conventional macroeconomic theory, the 
inflation-unemployment trade-off is central to understanding not only 
the effects of monetary policy, but also the other policies and events 
that influence the aggregate demand for goods and services. The notion 





5.  New challenges to the Natural Rate Hypothesis 
 
The natural rate of unemployment is, in the early definition, the out-
come of all the distortions created by government intervention. This 
definition evolved with the time inconsistency literature, since a gov-
ernment or a central bank can go below the natural rate by deciding on 
discretionary policy. Obviously there is a cost of doing so, and this cost 
is the inflationary bias. 
 
Already in 1980, Buiter (1980) pointed out that the main assumption of 
the Monetarists was weak: money is not neutral, nor is monetary or fis-
cal policy. In a non-Walrasian framework,  Buiter (1980) demonstrated 
that the natural rate hypothesis and its assumptions can be easily chal-
lenged, and further works were required to prevent any misleading 
conclusions in terms of monetary policy. Buiter (1980) relied on the 
existence of market imperfections and costly information to challenge 18    
 
the rational expectations assumption  (Akerlof, 1970, Salop, 1978, 
Stiglitz, 1979, Wilson, 1979). To Buiter (1980), there are real conse-
quences of monetary and fiscal policy – anticipated and unanticipated. 
 
Another set of arguments questioning the natural rate of unemployment 
challenges the idea of a steady natural rate. Hysteresis theories merely 
give one reason to expect the NAIRU to change over time. The 
NAIRU has followed a hump-shaped path in the US: it rose from the 
1960s until about 1980, peaked around this time, and has been declin-
ing since then. There is empirical evidence that during the late 1990s in 
the US, the NAIRU declined substantially. To approximate the NAIRU, 
economists used the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick & Prescott, 1997). 
The estimated NAIRU was 5.4 percent in 1960, peaked at 6.8 percent 
in 1979, and fell to 4.9 percent in 2000 (Ball & Mankiw, 2002). 
 
As underscored by Collignon (2005): “While unemployment in the US 
seems to have oscillated around a stable long term rate, the secular rise 
in European unemployment is explained by shifts in the natural rate. 
Social benefits and strong trade unions are supposed to be the cause of 
this rising unemployment. Policy proposals combating euro-
unemployment focus on ‘structural reforms’ in goods and labour mar-
kets, although the results are rarely convincing Blanchard & Wolfers 
(2000). The gap between theory and practice indicates faults in the-
ory.” 
 
As empirical evidence revealed (Galbraith, 1997, Gordon, 1996), the 
natural rate was no longer fixed. While a stable NAIRU may still work 
for the US (Smyth & Easaw, 2001), the large fluctuations in Europe 
are incompatible with the stable NRH Blanchard & Summers (1988), 
Collignon (2002), Karanassou & Snower (1997), S olow & Taylor 
(1998), and Karanassou, Sala, & Snower (2003) show that the rise in 
EU unemployment in the 1970s and early 1980s was largely due to 
permanent shocks such as the decline in capital formation, while the 
increase of the early 1990s resulted from temporary shocks such as ris-
ing interest rates. Henry, Karanassou, & Snower (2000) sensibly ob-
served a stable natural rate for the UK over the long run, but medium-
run swings in unemployment due to transitory but long-lasting shocks. 
Haldane & Quah (1999) observed a similar pattern for the Phillips 
curve. 
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The question then is how is the general equilibrium determined? In 
other words, how is the structure of the economy affected? Can it be 
influenced by monetary policy when the natural rate of unemployment 
changes? An answer was provided by Collignon (2005) “Usually, the 
natural rate (or its correlate, the NAIRU) serves as a benchmark for 
monetary policy. If the capital market adjusts to the labour market, 
equilibrium unemployment will determine the natural rate of interest at 
which price stability is maintained. But if l abour and capital market 
equilibria are determined simultaneously, the anchor for monetary pol-
icy disappears.” Thus, Collignon (2005) saw two issues for monetary 
policy: “first, if there is a rate of unemployment, below which inflation 
accelerates, and if the exact position of this natural rate is uncertain and 
moving, what interest level should be targeted by the central bank? 
Second, if it could be shown that the average rate of unemployment is 
affected by monetary policy, the natural rate cannot be exogenous and 
the neutrality hypothesis would not even apply in the long run.” 
 
Challenges to the natural rate hypothesis go even farther: indeed, ac-
cording to Collignon (2005) instead of one natural rate of unemploy-
ment, there may be multiple natural rates of unemployment: “if causa-
tion runs in the opposite direction and the equilibria in the labour and 
capital market are simultaneously determined, the dynamics of a d-
justment become richer and multiple ‘natural’ equilibria are possible 
(see also Dixon, 1995). 
 
But the discretion side has also been revived by many authors who 
show that discretionary policy-making in a world with forward-looking 
agents is characterized by a “stabilization bias”  (Svensson, 1997, 
Woodford, 1999). Indeed, money may be helpful in an inflation-
targeting regime when the central bank acts under discretion. As shown 
by Woodford (1999), discretionary monetary policies provide a “stabi-
lization bias” in the sense that the optimal discretionary policy rule is 
less inertial than the welfare-optimizing rule obtained under pre-
commitment. Therefore, if commitments are not possible, assigning to 
the central bank a mechanism that makes discretionary policy more in-
ertial may lead to better social outcomes (Soderstrom, 2005). 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
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On its face, unemployment seems to be a concept easy to grasp. But 
when one looks closer, the intricacies are numerous and assumptions 
are multiple. It is, thus, no surprise to see that it takes every school of 
thought two decades to gather its arguments in order to challenge the 
predominant doctrine. 
 
Nowadays, the New Classical School is a bit closer to New Keynesian-
ism than ever before. It still has a strong footprint in Monetarism, since 
in the long run, there is n o interest in stabilizing an economy. But 
unlike the Classical school, the New Classical School concedes that in 
the short run things are much more complicated. 
 
If Keynes was right when he said, “in the long run, we are all dead,” 
one may even conclude that the New Classical School is far more 
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